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
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12 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Possible Deployment of Soviet MRBMs and  
IRBMs Outside the Eurasian-Soviet Bloc


Attached for consideration of the COMOR at its meeting on 13 December is a memorandum on the above subject prepared by the Working Group. This is responsive to the question raised by the State Department member at the meeting of 15 November (COMOR-M-119, paragraph 8).

  
James Q. Reber  
Chairman  
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

25X1A

Attachment:  
Subject paper

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Possible Deployment of Soviet MRBMs and  
IRBMs Outside the Eurasian-Soviet Bloc

1. Our recent experience in Cuba has demonstrated that the USSR has available missiles of medium and intermediate range which it is willing to deploy outside the USSR in a manner designed to shift the balance of nuclear power and embarrass or endanger the U. S. and its allies. Having been frustrated in its Cuban venture, the USSR may attempt to develop a similar missile capability in an area of the world where the U. S. has less capability of frustrating Soviet objectives. At the present time we have no evidence that the Soviets are deploying surface to surface missiles (missiles removed from Cuba are being redeployed) outside the USSR or any firm indication that such (re)deployment is planned. There is, however, considerable evidence of increased military aid to such countries as Indonesia, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria; and available information justifies the conclusion that surface to air missiles (certain types of missiles other than medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles) have been furnished to these countries. Under the circumstances it is imperative that we employ every intelligence resource to insure that these military buildups do not include weapons that would extend the Soviet range of striking power to areas of the world which now feel relatively secure from nuclear threats.

25X1A 2. On the basis of the information currently available, Indonesia is the area in which Soviet military activities most strongly resemble a prelude to the introduction of such missiles as the Sandal, the Shyster, [REDACTED]. The reported emplacement of surface to air missiles, the presence of significant numbers of Soviet military technicians, and the supplying of bombers and anti-shiping missiles all suggest a disturbing parallel to developments in Cuba preceding the establishment of the MRBM and IRBM missile sites. Intermediate-range missiles in Indonesia would threaten Australia, the Philippines, Guam, and Taiwan, and probably would create damaging repercussions within the SEATO alliance. Although it is possible that the buildup of armaments was intended only to support Djakarta in its claims on West New Guinea, the scale of Soviet activity and the altered circumstances since the Soviet failure in Cuba suggest a potentially dangerous situation which demands investigation.

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3. For these reasons the COMOR recommends early U-2 coverage of the Indonesian archipelago with missions based on target listings recently developed for this area. The urgency of early coverage is dictated by the probability that the Soviets have profited by mistakes in Cuba and would attempt to introduce operational SAM sites and camouflaging techniques as soon as possible in their schedule. In addition to confirming or negating the presence of ballistic missiles and other strategic or tactical weapons systems, U-2 coverage of this area, taken in context with that acquired in Cuba, should provide standards which later would be useful in interpreting coverage of other areas of the world.

4. At the present time there is insufficient evidence of missile-related activities in the Middle East to justify a request for U-2 coverage. The two primary areas of interest would be Iraq and Egypt. COMOR recommends the acquisition and interpretation of satellite photography on these areas as a necessary preliminary to any request for a development of U-2 capability in the Middle East.

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